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RISK IN GOOD V. UNITED STATES
"And all because of a rat and a rabbit."
-Florida landowner Lloyd Good
Jr. on why his case was turned down
by the Supreme Court.1
INTRODUCTION
When Lloyd A. Good Jr. purchased his property in the Florida
Keys in 1973,2 he got more than he bargained for. According to offi-
cials, at play among the mangroves on his newly acquired acreage
were the silver rice rat and the Lower Keys rabbit. Both species
would eventually be classified as endangered under the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 ("ESA"), a piece of legislation that was not yet
passed when Good purchased the property, and both would play a
key role in thwarting Good's plans to develop his property.
Years later, when Good tried to obtain permits to develop the
acreage, he was denied on the grounds that development of his prop-
erty would threaten the two endangered species that called his land
1 Quote of the Day, Greenwire, Apr. 4,2000, available in LEXIS, Greenwire File.
2 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1053 (2000).
3 See id. at 1359; Good maintains that no silver rice rat has ever been found on his prop-
erty. See Prepared Statement of Lloyd A. Good, Jr., Affected Property Owner, Before the House
Committee on Resources Report on Effect of Endangered Species Act on Private Property
Rights, Federal News Service, Mar. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, Federal News Service File
[hereinafter Good Statement].
4 On December 28, 1973, nearly three months after Good purchased his property, Con-
gress passed the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 81 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994)).
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home.5 Good sued the federal government, claiming a regulatory
taking of his property.6 He argued that the denial of his permit to
dredge and fill marshland on his parcel was a taking of his property
without the Vayment of just compensation as required by the U.S.
Constitution.
In denying Good's claim, the Federal Circuit held that he did not
have the reasonable, investment-backed expectation necessary to sup-
port a regulatory takings claim.8 Although the ESA, which eventually
caused the denial of his permit, was not enacted until after Good pur-
chased the property, the court reasoned that, given the "regulatory
climate" at the time, he should have known that society's increasing
environmental awareness would result in the passage of legislation
making it impossible to develop the property.9 The court held, there-
fore, that Good could not have reasonably expected that he would be
permitted to develop the property, and thus his claim failed as a mat-
ter of law.10
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze this decision and its
potential ramifications and to suggest a better way for courts to ap-
proach similar problems. In particular, courts should adopt a "spe-
cific" theory of regulatory risk, in which the regulatory risk assumed
by a purchaser is evaluated only with respect to the challenged regu-
lation. Following this approach would bring investment-backed ex-
pectations jurisprudence into line with notions of fairness and justice
and would be consistent with case law and commentary in this area of
the law. Such an approach would have also yielded a different result
in Good.
Part I provides a very brief summary of some relevant back-
ground principles of regulatory takings jurisprudence, and Part II pre-
sents the facts and reasoning of the courts in Good v. United States.
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's decision, discussion of the difficul-
ties raised by the court's approach, and suggestions for improvements
can be found in Part DE1.
5 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1359.
6 See id. at 1357.
7 See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
8 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1363.
9 See id. at 1361-63 ("In view of the regulatory climate that existed when Appellant
acquired the subject property, Appellant could not have had a reasonable expectation that he
would obtain approval to fill ten acres of wetlands in order to develop the land.").




Even though the law of regulatory takings has justifiably been
called a "puzzle"11 and even a "muddle,"' 2 it can be argued that the
Supreme Court's recent decisions have clarified this area of the law.'
3
Because this Comment addresses a relatively small portion of the
overall regulatory takings picture, a comprehensive overview of the
entire body of regulatory takings law is beyond its scope. But a brief
summary of certain portions of the law is necessary to support the
argument put forward.'
4
The origin of takings law is the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution, which provides that private property shall not be taken by the
government without the payment of just compensation.' 5 The pur-
pose of the provision is to "bar government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."'
16
Until 1922, the Supreme Court had consistently held that this
constitutional provision applied only to physical appropriations of
property by the government. Regulations that diminished or extin-
guished the value of property without actual physical occupation were
treated merely as legitimate exercises of the police power not requir-
ing compensation. 17 This changed when the court decided Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon,8 in 1922. In Mahon, the Court held for the
first time that a regulation could create a compensable taking without
physical occupation.' 9 Justice Holmes, writing for the Mahon Court,
summarized the law as follows: "The general rule at least is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."20 One might say that the whole
of regulatory takings jurisprudence since that time can be character-
ized as a struggle to determine just exactly "how far is too far."21
" Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, in TAKINGS:
LAND DEVELOPMENT CoNDrIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFrER DOLAN AND LUCAS 107
(David L. Callies ed., 1996).
12 Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L REv. 561 (1984).
13 See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 11.
14 For a more comprehensive treatment of the body of regulatory takings law, see, e.g.,
STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1996); DOUGLAS T. KENDALL Er AL., TAKINGS
LITIGATION HANDBOOK (2000); TAKINGS, supra note 11.
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.").
16 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
17 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding a state statute outlawing
the production of alcoholic beverages that, without the payment of compensation, caused a
brewery owner to incur large monetary losses).
's 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
19 See KENDALL ET AL., supra note 14, at 15.
2 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
21 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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Of course, on the other side of the ledger stands a large body of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, represented by Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,22 holding that governments possess extensive po-
lice power to regulate property without compensating landowners,
even when the regulation results in large diminishments in value.2
3
This tension between the government's power to regulate and the
rights of the private property owner is evident in every takings case.
In fact, one of the most important modern regulatory takings cases,
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,24 has been
called "The Culmination of Euclidean Zoning,, 25 and "[t]he high-
water mark in the ascendancy of land use regulation."
26
In Penn Central the Court found that no compensable regulatory
taking had occurred, even though the regulation in question undenia-
bly prohibited the owner from developing property that would have
generated millions of dollars in additional income.2 In analyzing the
case, however, the Court emphasized that regulatory takings are in
some instances compensable, and, after cautioning that there is no
set formula for such an inquiry,29 enumerated three factors that are
significant in determining whether or not a regulatory taking has oc-
curred:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court's decisions have identified several factors that have
particular significance. The economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is
the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may
more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government
than when interference arises from some public program ad-
22 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23 See id. at 384 (upholding the challenged zoning ordinance without compensation even
though it reduced the value of Ambler Realty's property from $10,000 per acre to $2,500 per
acre).
24 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
25 EAGLE, supra note 14, § 6-4.
2 Id.
27 See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 116 (explaining the financial benefit to flow to Penn Cen-
tral from the proposed development).
28 See id. at 122 n.25 ("As is implicit in our opinion, we do not embrace the proposition
that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred physical control over a portion
of a parcel.").
29 See id. at 124 ("[This Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set for-
mula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately con-
centrated on a few persons.") (citations omitted).
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justing the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good. °
Courts continue to apply these factors laid out in 1978 by Justice
Brennan in regulatory takings cases. 1 Indeed, the Federal Circuit
employed these factors in deciding Good v. United States.2
In 1992, the Court altered the regulatory taking landscape again
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,3 3 setting forth a new
"categorical" rule for takings when the challenged regulation deprives
the owner of all economically viable use of her property.34 The Court
laid down the rule that such a taking is a per se taking requiring com-
pensation without further inquiry unless the government can show
that the planned use for the property would have been prohibited by
"background principles" of the state's common law of property and
was therefore never part of the owner's title.
35
II. GOOD V. UNITED STATES-THE FACTS AND THE OPINIONS
On October 8, 1973, Good purchased property on Lower Sugar-
loaf Key, near Key West, Florida.3 6 The property at issue in Good v.
United States consisted of forty acres of vacant waterfront land in-
cluded in this purchase. Eight acres of the property were uplands and
thirty-two acres were made up of both salt marsh and freshwater
marsh.37 The parcel was part of a larger purchase that included a
small resort called the Sugarloaf Lodge, the land surrounding the re-
sort, and other land in the vicinity of the resort. Good intended to
"operate and expand" the resort, as well as to develop the balance of
the property for a variety of uses. 8
At the time of the purchase, the forty-acre parcel was already
platted in a manner allowing for the construction of seventy-six sin-
30 Id. (citations omitted).
31 See, e.g., Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that
the court uses the Penn Central factors when presented with a regulatory taking case); Lovela-
dies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (utilizing Penn Central fac-
tors); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discuss-
ing the Penn Central factors).
32 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (summarizing the
Penn Central factors).
3 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
3 See id. at 1015 (explaining that "we have found categorical treatment appropriate...
where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land").
35 See id. at 1027 ("Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antece-
dent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were
not part of his title to begin with.").
36 See Good Statement, supra note 3.
37 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1357.
m See Good Statement, supra note 3. Good subsequently developed part of the property
into an RV park but was unable to develop any additional property or to expand the resort. See
id.
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gle-family homes, five canals, and four streets. The parcel was lo-
cated adjacent to other similar subdivisions with canals and streets
that had already been developed, although few homes had yet been
built.39 Good says that at the time of the purchase, he intended to de-
velop the parcel "into a first class, single family, waterfront or water
oriented community.
' 40
When Good bought the land, permits had not yet been obtained
to construct the canals or fill other parts of the property.41 The Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") was not at that time exercising juris-
diction over property above the mean high tide line,42 and the ESA
had not yet been enacted.43 Of course, this also means that the Lower
Keys rabbit and the silver rice rat were not listed as endangered spe-
cies at the time of the purchase. In fact, the rabbit and rat were not
placed on the endangered species list until 1990 and 1991, respec-
tively.44 Still, the purchase agreement for the property included an
ominous sounding warning: "[t]he Buyers recognize that certain of
the lands covered by this contract may be below the mean high tide
line and that as of today there are certain problems in connection with
the obtainin of State and Federal permission for dredging and filling
operations.'
According to Good, however, all of the property to be developed
was above the mean high tide line and would therefore not have re-
quired Corps permits to dredge and fill in 1973. But after the Corps
began exercising jurisdiction over property above the mean high tide-
line, much of the property to be developed was classified as wet-
lands.46 This meant that Corps permits would be required for dredg-
ing or filling on those portions of the property.47
Good's quest for permits to develop the property began in 1980,
seven years after he purchased the land.48 With the passage of the
ESA in 1973, and the new Corps jurisdiction over wetlands, the
regulatory landscape had changed significantly in the years since his





43 The Act was passed approximately three months after Good bought his property. See
supra note 4.
44 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for the Lower
Keys Rabbit and Threatened Status for the Squirrel Chimney Cave Shrimp, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,588
(1990) [hereinafter Rabbit Listing]; Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endan-
gered Status for the Lower Keys Population of the Rice Rat (Silver Rice Rat), 56 Fed. Reg.
19,809 (1991) [hereinafter Rat Listing].
45 Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting the purchase
agreement).
46 See Good Statement, supra note 3.
47 See id.
48 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1357.
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firm, to assist him in acquiring the necessary permits. Like the pur-
chase agreement, the Keycology contract contained a clause warning
that "obtaining said permits is at best difficult and by no means as-
sured. '49
The initial development plan called for creating a fifty-four lot
subdivision and a forty-eight slip marina by filling 7.4 acres of salt
marsh and excavating 5.4 acres of marsh.50 In March of 1981, Good
filed his application with the Corps for the permit to dredge and fill
according to the development plan. After some modifications, this
permit was issued on January 6, 1984.51
Good, however, still needed to receive permission from state and
county authorities, and this would prove no easy task. 2 After years
of conditional approvals, denials, appeals, litigation, and bureaucratic
wrangling, Good scaled back his plans.53 He had obtained approval
from every federal, state, and county agency except the South Florida
Water Management District ("SFWMD"), which wanted to modify




SFWMD suggested that Good instead pursue a plan for the property
that would involve only sixteen waterfront lots and the placement of
the balance of the land "in preservation."55  After considering the
plan, Good decided that it was acceptable, but this meant reapplying
for permits to carry it out.5 6 Thus, in July 1990 Good filed a new
permit application with the Corps. 7
In June 1990, however, the Lower Keys rabbit had been listed as
an endangered species.5 8 This meant that the Corps would have to
consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") before is-
suing a permit to make sure that the planned development would not
jeopardize the endangered species.5 9 Initially, FWS issued a biologi-
cal opinion in February 1991 finding "no jeopardy" to the Lower
Keys rabbit as a result of the proposed sixteen-lot development.60
New information later surfaced, however, regarding a possible further
decline in the rabbit population, 61 and in April 1991 the silver rice rat





52 See id. at 1357-58.
53 See id. at 1358-59; Good Statement, supra note 3.
54 Good Statement, supra note 3.
55 d
56 See id.
5 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1358-59.
58 See id at 1359; Rabbit Listing, supra note 44.
59 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
60 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1359.
61 See Good Statement, supra note 3.
62 See Rat Listing, supra note 44.
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The Corps initiated further consultation with FWS, and, on De-
cember 18, 1991, FWS issued a new biological opinion finding that
the proposed develos ment jeopardized the silver rice rat as well as the
Lower Keys rabbit. FWS had changed its mind regarding jeopardy
to the rabbit based on the new information about a possible popula-
tion decline.64 The new FWS opinion also found that the fifty-five-lot
plan for which the Corps had issued a permit in 1988 jeopardized
both species.65 Over two years later, on March 17, 1994, the Corps
denied Good's 1990 permit application and refused to extend the time
period for the 1988 permit, which had expired.66 The Corps cited the
potential jeopardy to both species posed by the development as its
reason for denying the permits.67
On July 11, 1994, Good filed suit against the United States in the
Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the denial of his permits con-
stituted a taking of his property without the payment of compensation
as demanded by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.68
A. Disposition in the Court of Federal Claims
The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment to the
United States,69 holding that Good's claim failed as a matter of law
under either Lucas7° or the Penn Central71 balancing test.72 The court
held that Good failed the Lucas test-the government was able to
show that the property retained value because the ESA did not require
him to leave the property in its natural state.73 Moreover, the gov-
ernment presented evidence showing that the property could still be
developed in some fashion or that transferable development rights
could be sold, and the court held that Good had not presented evi-
dence sufficient to create an issue of fact as to value.74
The court also held that Good's claim fell short under a Penn
Central analysis.75 The court reasoned that because there were fed-
eral and state regulations restricting his ability to develop the property
63 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1359; Good Statement, supra note 3.
64 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1359 n.7. Good disputes the validity of this "new information"
about a population decline. He says that the "rabbit population of the Lower Keys was errone-
ously thought to have been decreased because of a grass burn on my property adjoining Sugar-
loaf Lodge. (This bum actually helped the habitat.)" Good Statement, supra note 3.
0 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1359.
66 See id.; Good Statement, supra note 3.
67 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1359.
68 See id.
69 See Good v. United States, 39 Fed. CI. 81, 84 (1997).
70 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
71 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).






at the time of purchase as well as when he began to pursue develop-
ment permits seven years later, Good did not have a reasonable, in-
vestment-backed expectation that he would be able to develop the
property.76 Finding Good's claim wanting under either the Lucas test
or the Penn Central test, the court held that no taking had occurred
and granted summary judgment to the United States. 77 Good ap-
pealed to the Federal Circuit.
B. The Federal Circuit Opinion in Good v. United States
The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to the United States, focusing almost solely on the reason-
able, investment-backed expectation requirement.78 The Federal Cir-
cuit concluded that Good lacked a reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectation that he would be able to develop the property at the time he
purchased it.7 9 The court reached this conclusion by taking a gener-
alized approach to the type of pre-existing regulations that could have
defeated Good's expectations. In other words, the court held that
even though a law passed after Good's purchase eventually became
the insurmountable obstacle to developing the property, not regula-
tions in place at the time of purchase, the fact that some government
restrictions existed at the time he purchased the property, combined
with a general societal trend toward greater environmental protection,
was enough to defeat Good's expectations.80
The court began its analysis by laying out the significant factors
in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred, as enumer-
ated in Penn Central.81 The court summarized those factors in the
following way: "(1) the character of the government action, (2) the
extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct, investment-
backed expectations, and (3) the economic impact of the regula-
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360-63 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
79 See id. at 1363. Specifically, the Federal Circuit held:
We therefore conclude that Appellant lacked a reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectation that he would obtain the regulatory approval needed to develop the prop-
erty at issue here. We have previously held that the government is entitled to sum-
mary judgment on a regulatory takings claim where the plaintiffs lacked reasonable,
investment-backed expectations, even where the challenged government action
"substantially reduc[ed] the value of plaintiffs' property."
Id. (quoting Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
t See id. at 1361-62 ("In view of the regulatory climate that existed when Appellant
acquired the subject property, Appellant could not have had a reasonable expectation that he
would obtain approval to fill ten acres of wetlands in order to develop the land."). Good did,
however, obtain just such an approval from the Army Corps of Engineers, more than once, and
he obtained it after wetlands regulations tightened from their 1973 levels. See id.
81 See id at 1360; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
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tion. ' 82 As in the court below, the Federal Circuit found the expecta-
tions factor to be dispositive and therefore did not engage in any
analysis involving the other two factors.83
Next, the court examined whether Good satisfied the reasonable,
investment-backed expectation prong of the Penn Central test. In
discussing the applicable rules, the court cited another Federal Circuit
case, Creppel v. United States,84 as standing for the proposition that
"[t]he requirement of investment-backed expectations 'limits recov-
ery to owners who can demonstrate that they bought their proerty in
reliance on the non-existence of the challenged regulation. 5 The
court explained that reasonable, investment-backed expectations are
an essential element of every regulatory takings case, because if the
buyer of the property has notice of the restraint before the purchase,
then he either assumed the risk of economic loss or, at minimum, will
be unable to show loss because the market will have already dis-
counted the property's price to account for the regulation.
86
Good argued that he had actually had a reasonable, investment-
backed expectation that he would be able to develop the property.87
He argued that the Corps permit requirements that existed at the time
of his purchase should be irrelevant to determining his reasonable
expectations because he obtained the needed dredge and fill permits
three times before being eventually denied the permits after the
Lower Keys rabbit and the silver rice rat were listed as endangered
88 89species. The court rejected this argument, however. In reaching
the conclusion that Good lacked a reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectation, the court emphasized that at the time he purchased the
property, regulations were in place that required the permission of
82 Good, 189 F.3d at 1360 (paraphrasing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
83 See id.
41 F.3d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
8 Good, 189 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Creppel, 41 F.3d at 632).
86 See id. at 1360-61.
87 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1361. Good also made the argument that the Supreme Court had
done away with the reasonable, investment-backed expectation requirement in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The court dealt with this in fairly perfunctory
fashion, though, reasoning that the Supreme Court had not eliminated the need for reasonable
expectations, but had simply not discussed the requirement because the Lucas plaintiff so obvi-
ously met the standard. See Good, 189 F.3d at 1361. In fact, the Court did mention the concept
as still viable, and helped to seal the shift in terminology from Justice Brennan's "distinct, in-
vestment-backed expectations" formulation from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), to Justice Scalia's "reasonable expectations" formulation
in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. See EAGLE, supra note 14, § 8-2; David L. Callies, After Lucas
and Dolan: An Introductory Essay, in TAKINGS, supra note 11, at 9 ("This 'frustration of in-
vestment-backed expectations' standard, which the Court chooses not to apply in Lucas because
it characterized the regulatory taking as total, is clearly not rejected. Indeed, one concurring
member of the Court (Justice Kennedy) would have applied it.").
8 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1361.
89 See id. ("Appellant's position is not entirely unreasonable, but we must ultimately reject
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several government agencies before development.90 In addition to the
Corps permits, the court explained, any development would have had
to have been approved by both Florida and Monroe County offi-
cials. 91 Furthermore, the court weighed in the balance the fact that
environmental considerations were already a part of the Corps' permit
approval process in 1973 and that by then they had denied other per-
mits based strictly on environmental concerns. 92 And Good had ac-
knowledged in the purchase agreement for the property that "[t]he
Buyers recognize that ... as of today there are certain problems in
connection with the obtaining of State and Federal permission for
dredging and filling operations. 93
The court also emphasized that Good did not develop the prop-
erty immediately after buying it, and that a number of regulations,
including the ESA, were passed during the time between his ?urchase
in 1973 and the start of his development activities in 1980.9 A sig-
nificant portion of the court's analysis is devoted to this issue, and the
opinion includes a listing of federal and state environmental regula-
tions enacted between 1973 and 1980.9' This issue seems to have
deeply concerned the court,9 6 although it did note that this issue might
be irrelevant to a regulatory takings claim: "While Appellant's pro-
longed inaction does not bar his takings claim, it reduces his ability to
fairly claim surprise when his permit application was denied. 97 The
court reasoned that Good must have been aware that the requirements
for obtaining the permits could change, and that, given the larger so-
cietal trend toward increasing environmental awareness, it could be-
come more difficult to obtain the permit.9'
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concluded that Good
did not have a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that he
would be able to develop the property and that his claim therefore
failed as a matter of law. Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision granting summary judgment to the government. 99
90 See id. at 1362 ("In 1973, when Appellant purchased the subject land, federal law re-
quired that a permit be obtained from the Army Corps of Engineers in order to dredge or fill in
wetlands adjacent to a navigable waterway.").
9' See id.
92 See id.
93 Id. (quoting the purchase agreement).
94 See id. at 1362.
95 See id. (explaining that the ESA was passed in December of 1973, that the Corps tight-
ened regulation of wetlands in both 1975 and 1977, that Florida passed a state version of the
ESA in 1977, and that, in 1979, Florida passed the Florida Keys Protection Act, which desig-
nated the Keys as an "Area of Critical State Concern").
96 See id. ('The picture emerges, then, of Appellant in 1973 acknowledging the difficulty
of obtaining approval for his project, then waiting seven years, watching as the applicable regu-
lations got more stringent, before taking any steps to obtain the required approval.").
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ItI. WHY GooD V. UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED
DIFFERENTLY
The bottom line of the Good decision is that the property owner
was denied relief because of a lack of reasonable, investment-backed
expectations, even though the challenged regulation had not been en-
acted when he had purchased the property. This section of the Com-
ment will analyze the legal basis for this ruling, the public policy con-
siderations surrounding the issue, and implications of this case for
other regulatory takings cases. Finally, this section proposes a better
approach to the analysis of investment-backed expectations in cases
like Good.
Given the current state of regulatory takings law and the facts of
this case, it is difficult to state unequivocally that the ultimate out-
come in Good was wrong.100 The law is particularly ulnclear when it
comes to investment-backed expectations, 101 and there is reason to
doubt some of Good's factual assertions. 10 2  Moreover, the court
might have arrived at the same conclusion through other analytical
approaches. For instance, in the court of claims proceedings the gov-
ernment presented evidence that the value of Good's property had not
been extinguished, and the court below therefore held that there was
no per se taking under Lucas.103  If this is true, and the remaining
value of the land was significant, then the court could simply have
held that the economic impact was not severe enough to require com-
pensation 04 and that this was just another example of "adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good."105  After all, courts have upheld enormous diminishments in
1oo One commentator has stated that "[tihe facts in the Good case do lend themselves to
bad law." Steven J. Eagle, Under New Ruling, Land Owners Can't Expect Constitutional Pro-
tection, LEGAL OPINION LETrER, Dec. 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, Washington Legal Foun-
dation File.
1o1 See Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, in
TAKINGS, supra note 11, at 119 ("Unfortunately, the Court is confused about the meaning of
this term, federal and state courts divide on how to apply it, and its role in takings law remains a
puzzle.").
102 Good argued, for example, that the value of his land was completely extinguished by
operation of the ESA, but in the lower court proceedings the government presented evidence
that Good's property retained significant value and could still be developed and the court found
that Good did not present enough evidence to create an issue of fact on this point. See Good v.
United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 106 (1997).
'03 See Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at 99. The government presented extensive evidence that Good's
property retained significant value, and that development was still possible despite the presence
of the endangered species. See id. at 106-09. The court also found that Good had never re-
ceived a final approval of needed state and county permits. See id. at 90 n.17.
104 Of course, this might have simply been the result of the procedural posture of the case.
Good disputed the government's evidence of value, and since the court was ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, it might have chosen to dispose of the case using the investment-backed
expectation analysis because the factual predicates for that analysis were not in dispute. Given
the facts relating to value as found by the lower court, this seems likely.
1o5 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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value without requiring compensation using this rationale. 06
Whether or not one agrees with such an approach, this would have
made the case unremarkable and in line with other such cases.
10 7
However, this is not the analysis that the court used, and al-
though it may not be possible to determine whether the ultimate out-
come was wrong, there is enough information to conclude that the
court's analysis was flawed. The court's analysis was flawed because
of its focus on events that transpired after Good purchased the prop-
erty and because it held that regulatory risk created by a regulatory
scheme that Good was able to repeatedly satisfy was sufficient to de-
feat Good's claim that the operation of a different regulation, passed
after his purchase, worked a taking of his property. Thus, Good could
be applied in other cases to arrive at inequitable results. Since this
analysis is what now stands as precedent, this Comment is more con-
cerned with the ramifications of the court's analysis than with the is-
sue of whether Good's claim was in fact wrongly denied.
Because the Good court found the investment-backed expecta-
tion prong of the Penn Central test to be dispositive, it focused almost
entirely on this factor.10 8 The key facts that contributed to Good's
lack of reasonable expectations, according to the court, were (1) that
there was a regulatory regime in place at the time of Good's purchase
that required him to obtain permits for dredging and filling from the
Corps, (2) that there was a general societal trend toward increasing
environmental awareness, and (3) that during the time between
Good's purchase of the land in 1973 and the start of his efforts to de-
velop the property in 1980, regulatory restrictions on the property had
become more stringent.'
9
A. The Court's Analysis of After-Purchase Events
One troubling aspect of the Good decision is the fact that the
court took into account events that transpired after the purchase when
evaluating Good's investment-backed expectations. The court placed
great importance on this line of reasoning and detailed in its opinion
the regulatory tightening that occurred during that period, explaining
that "[w]hile Appellant's prolonged inaction does not bar his takings
106 See, e.g., id. (upholding landmark designation of New York's Grand Central Station
without the payment of compensation, costing owner millions in revenue due to lost develop-
ment opportunity); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding,
without compensation to the owner, a zoning ordinance that reduced the value of the owner's
property from $10,000 per acre to $2,500 per acre).
1o7 See cases cited supra note 106.
108 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fd. Cir. 1999).
'09 See id. at 1361-63.
20011
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
claim, it reduces his ability to fairly claim surprise when his permit
application was denied."' 
10
Although the court stopped short of holding that post-purchase
events barred Good's claim, they clearly influenced the court's ulti-
mate determination. Moreover, the court used this information in an
odd, temporally confused kind of way. The court explained that
Good must have been "aware at the time of purchase of the need for
regulatory approval to develop his land. He must also be presumed to
have been aware of the greater general concern for environmental
matters during the period of 1973 to 1980."' Therefore, "[i]n light
of the growing consciousness of and sensitivity toward environmental
issues,"' 1 2 the court concluded that Good "lacked a reasonable, in-
vestment-backed expectation that he would obtain the regulatory ap-
proval needed to develop the property at issue here."'1 3 It appears
that the court is either charging Good at the time of purchase with
knowledge of future events or evaluating Good's investment-backed
expectations at the time he applied for his permits rather than at the
time that he bought the property. The first alternative simply makes
no sense, and the second is not supported by the case law.
ll4
There is another glaring flaw in the court's analysis of events
after Good's purchase. Although the court considered the trend of
tightening environmental regulation from 1973 to 1980, it completely
ignored the fact that in the heightened regulatory environment that the
court made much of, long after the ESA was passed, Good obtained
permits for dredging and filling from the Corps, not just once, but
three times.1 15 Certainly, if one is going to consider events after pur-
chase in evaluating Good's investment-backed expectations, the per-
mits should be considered. When one factors in Good's initial suc-
cess in obtaining the necessary Corps permits, even in the face of
tighter regulation, it seems legitimate to conclude that Good's ability
to claim surprise when the Corps eventually denied his permit was in
fact heightened by events after his purchase rather than reduced.




114 Investment-backed expectations are evaluated as of the time that the property is pur-
chased. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 92 (1997) ("The reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations factor of the Penn Central test properly limits recovery to property
owners who can demonstrate that their investment was made in reliance upon the non-existence
of the challenged regulatory regime.... This inquiry is informed ... by whether the specific
regulatory restrictions were in place at the time of purchase .. ") (citations omitted).
11 Good's first request for a permit was granted in May 1983. Good later modified his
request and the modified permit was granted in January 1984. The five-year time limit on these
permits was running out while Good was trying to obtain state and county approval, so he ap-
plied to the Corps for an extension. The Corps made some changes, "but granted a new permit
allowing substantially the same development" in October 1988. Good, 189 F.3d at 1358.
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However, this whole line of reasoning in Good is superfluous
because the court had already stated that, given the regulatory climate
at the time of his purchase, Good "could not have had a reasonable
expectation that he would obtain approval to fill ten acres of wetlands
in order to develop the land."' 1 6 If he had no reasonable expectation
to start with, it does not matter what the regulatory climate was after
he purchased the land." 7 If, on the other hand, Good had a reason-
able expectation at the time of the purchase, then the case law simply
does not support invalidating that expectation purely because of the
government's subsequent actions." 8
Logically, if the inability to "claim surprise" at the moment that
a permit is denied is allowed to defeat otherwise reasonable, invest-
ment-backed expectations, the government could take private prop-
erty for public use with impunity merely by announcing its intentions
well ahead of time. Because of the advance notice, owners would not
be surprised when the government merely did what it said it would do
in denying permits, thus defeating the investment-backed expecta-
tions even of owners who purchased their property decades before the
challenged regulation was enacted.
Perhaps this is why analysis of investment-backed expectations
in the case law focuses on objectivelX reasonable, rather than actual,
expectations at the time of purchase. 9 Considering events after the
owner's purchase in evaluating his investment-backed expectations
should have no place in a regulatory takings analysis.
B. The Court's Holding That Good Lacked Reasonable, Investment-
Backed Expectations
The most troubling aspect of this case is that although Good re-
peatedly satisfied the regulatory regime that existed at the time of
purchase, the Federal Circuit held that the same regime defeated his
investment-backed expectations. 120  Good obtained dredge and fill
permits from the Corps three different times during the course of his
quest to develop his property, and he did so even after the Corps
116 Id. at 1361-62.
117 This is assuming that the Penn Central test is the operative test, rather than Lucas.
Investment-backed expectations are not a part of the Lucas test. Good argued that his taking
was a Lucas taking, but the lower court held that Lucas did not apply because the value of his
property was not extinguished. See Good v. United States, 39 Fed. CI. 81, 84 (1997).118 See supra note 114.
19 See Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at 92-93 (explaining that in analyzing the investment-backed
expectations factor, courts look to, among other things, whether the "plaintiff's investment in
purchase and development can be considered objectively reasonable").
120 See supra note 115. Again, for purposes of this analysis, the effect of Good's apparent
failure to obtain final state and county approval is being purposely ignored here. The court did
not deny relief on this basis.
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tightened their regulation of wetlands from their 1973 levels. 121 In
fact, it appears that the Corps would have issued the permit even as
late as 1994 had it not been for the ESA.122 Moreover, the ESA was
not passed until after Good purchased the property, and even then the
species allegedly inhabiting his property were not given endangered
status until 1990 and 1991.123 Nevertheless, the court held that the
wetlands regulations in existence at the time of Good's purchase de-
feated his investment-backed expectations, and therefore Good's
claim that the operation of the ESA took his property was barred.
There are at least two discrete issues to be discussed here. One
is the court's troubling decision that Good did not have a reasonable
expectation that he would be able to obtain permits to dredge and fill,
in the face of the fact that he did so repeatedly. The other is the
court's holding that this lack of investment-backed expectation due to
wetlands regulation insulates the government from liability for a
regulatory taking accomplished by different legislation enacted after
the owner bought the property.
First, it is inexplicable that the court found that Good could not
reasonably have expected that he would obtain the dredge and fill
permits from the Corps that he eventually did obtain. It is true that
the expectations that are at issue here are not Good's actual expecta-
tions, but rather objectively reasonable expectations at the time of
purchase. 24 Nevertheless, in a case where a court holds that a regu-
latory taking plaintiff could not have reasonably expected to do that
which he was in fact able to do repeatedly, one might expect to see a
fact pattern indicating that the plaintiffs success was somehow un-
foreseen, or that he succeeded against all odds when no reasonable
person would have expected such success. However, this was not the
case here.
It is undeniable that there were wetlands regulations in place at
the time of Good's purchase in 1973,125 and it appears that even
though the Corps was not at that time exercising jurisdiction over
property above the mean high water mark, some of the property to be
developed was below that line, despite Good's objections to the con-
trary.'I" Good acknowledged in his purchase agreement for the prop-
121 See supra note 115; Good, 189 F.3d at 1362 (explaining that the wetlands regulations
tightened in 1975 and again in 1977).
122 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1359 ("The Corps based its denial on the threat that either proj-
ect posed to the endangered rat and rabbit.").
23 See supra note 4 regarding passage of the ESA. See supra note 44 regarding the en-
dangered status of the Lower Keys rabbit and the silver rice rat.
124 See supra note 119.
125 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1362.
'2 See Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 97 n.28 (1997) (explaining that Good's




erty the existence of the regulatory regime and unspecified potential
difficulties in obtaining permits.127 And the court of claims also noted
in its opinion that Good, an attorney originally from Philadelphia, had
worked with wetlands regulations in New Jersey and was therefore
aware of the regulations and their ramifications. 2"
Good's background as an attorney working with wetlands regu-
lations could help to explain how his expectations may have been rea-
sonable despite the ominous warning in the purchase agreement. It
could easily be that Good knew the regulations well enough to know
that, despite the regulations, what he wanted to do would most likely
be approved by the Corps. 29
It is easy to imagine that the seller, perhaps, was less knowl-
edgeable about such matters and did not know enough about the
regulations to recognize that the planned development was feasible.
Wanting to limit potential liability, perhaps even being over-cautious,
the seller may have added the disclaimer clause to the contract, and
Good, unconcerned, agreed to the inclusion of the clause. In fact, it
could easily be economically advantageous for a purchaser in this
situation to exaggerate the risk in order to drive the seller's price
down. Clauses in purchase agreements like this one should be evalu-
ated cautiously because there are many potential explanations for
their inclusion. Given the above scenario, for instance, or one like it,
the fact that Good signed the agreement would not necessarily mean
that he agreed with the seller's assessment of the situation, that the
seller was correct in that assessment, or that all other purchasers or
even regulators would have agreed with the seller at that point in
time.
Furthermore, the language of the clause contained in the contract
is ambiguous as to the precise nature of the anticipated difficulties.
On its face the clause does not state that the parties believed it to be
impossible or even difficult to obtain permits, only that there were
"certain problems" in getting the permits.1 30  This could mean any-
thing from "the permits are impossible to get," to "you now need
permits, whereas before you did not, and you may have to pay some
fees or modify your plans in some way to get them, but they are al-
ways issued."
'27 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1357.
'2 See Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at 88.
'29 This is not meant to imply that the courts use, or should use, a "reasonable attorney"
standard in determining the reasonableness of an owner's expectations. The nature of the stan-
dard for objective reasonableness, as with much of the law in this area, is something that has not
been precisely defined by the courts. See Mandelker, supra note 101, at 119 (explaining that
Supreme Court jurisprudence is confused about the meaning of investment-backed expectations,
that state and federal courts apply the term inconsistently, and that "its role in takings law re-
mains a puzzle").
'" See Good, 189 F.3d at 1357.
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Whether events transpired in precisely this way or not is un-
known, but it is known that Good claims that he expected to obtain
the permits and that he was right.13 1 The court accepted this contract
clause as evidence of the existence of an onerous regulatory regime
without detailed inquiry into the meaning of the ambiguous phrase or
the reasons for its inclusion in the contract. 32 The existence of the
disclaimer clause in the purchase agreement is certainly sufficient to
prove that Good had notice that there was a regulatory regime affect-
ing the property in place at the time of his purchase, but without ad-
ditional facts any inference beyond that (about the degree of risk pre-
sent, for instance) seems unwarranted. Given later events, it seems
more likely that the seller was mistaken as to the regulatory risk in-
volved in obtaining permits rather than that Good was simply wildly
lucky in obtaining Corps approval three times.
That Good obtained the permits three times, and apparently
would have obtained them the fourth time were it not for the ESA,
strongly suggests that obtaining the needed permits was not a Hercu-
lean task. In looking at events after Good's purchase, however, the
court completely ignored Good's success at obtaining permits and
instead focused on the environmental legislation enacted after his
purchase, concluding that this legislation reduced his expectations
that he would be able to develop his property. 133 But, as discussed
previously, this is backwards. If regulations became much more strict
after his purchase, and Good was still able to obtain approval from the
Corps repeatedly, this should indicate that his expectations at the time
of purchase were more, rather than less, reasonable.
Evidence that a plaintiff's plans were not in fact hindered by a
particular regulation should establish a rebuttable presumption that
the plaintiff's expectations with regard to that regulation were reason-
able. In the extraordinary situation where the plaintiff succeeded in
spite of great odds, this would allow the government to present evi-
dence of the regulatory hurdles faced by the owner in an attempt to
establish that his expectations were not objectively reasonable at the
time of purchase, even though he did eventually succeed in obtaining
regulatory approval. 1
34
Even if one assumes, however, that the Federal Circuit made the
proper decision by holding that Good did not have a reasonable ex-
pectation that he would obtain dredge and fill permits from the Corps,
there is still the question of whether the court should have held that
131 See supra note 115.
132 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1362.
'13 See id. at 1362-63.
'-3 Of course, most of the time, if a plaintiff succeeds in obtaining regulatory approval,
there is no regulatory takings issue. It is only in the unusual type of fact pattern found in Good
that this will be an issue.
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this was sufficient to defeat his claim that his property was taken by
operation of the ESA. In essence, the court used what might be called
a general regulatory risk theory. Although the court did not specifi-
cally use the term "regulatory risk," it essentially held that the exist-
ing wetlands regulations were enough to establish that Good had as-
sumed regulatory risk associated with the property, and once he as-
sumed any regulatory risk, he automatically assumed every regulatory
risk, including those that arose after his purchase.
135
Regulatory risk is a theory proposed by Professor Mandelker as a
way of making sense of the Supreme Court's confused jurisprudence
in the investment-backed expectations area.136 His proposal is that a
property owner's investment-backed expectations vary according to
the degree of risk involved in the regulatory environment at the time
of purchase. 37  The owner's investment-backed expectations are
evaluated as of the time she purchased the property, based upon the
information she had at that time. 138 He theorizes that "if a landowner
knows at the time she enters a land market that she is, or might be,
covered by a regulatory program in which government can deny per-
mission to develop her land, it is only fair that she assume the regu-
latory risk this program creates.' '139 Another facet of the theory is that
an owner "should be charged with constructive notice of regulatory
barriers when the market sends a signal that regulatory risk is
high."'14 A signal of this kind is sent "when a wide divergence in
opinion exists about whether the landowner will realize her expecta-
tions for development."' 4' According to his theory, "[c]ourts should
recognize landowner expectations when risks are minimal. They
should refuse to recognize landowner expectations when risks are
high." 142
Professor Mandelker explains that not all of the case law sup-
ports his theory. Some of the cases support only reliance by an owner
on vested rights created by government approval of development
plans. 43 Other cases support the regulatory risk theory, typified by
the statement in Good that "it is common sense that 'one who buys
135 See Good, 189 F.3d at 1361-63 ("[l]t is common sense that 'one who buys with knowl-
edge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss. In such a case, the owner presumably
paid a discounted price for the property. Compensating him for a 'taking' would confer a wind-
fall."') (quoting Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
t3 SeeMandelker, supra note 101, at 119.
'37 See id. at 139.
13s See id. at 129.
139 Id.140 id.
141 id.
142 Id. at 139.
141 See id. at 131.
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with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss."" 44
Professor Mandelker writes that his theory is not supported by any
"monolithic unitary theory," but rather that it "reflects a pragmatic
judgment about the property interests that courts decide are worth
protecting under the takings clause. Nothing else is possible.
1 45
Of course, this theory does not reduce the law of investment-
backed expectations to a set formula. It still requires that a court ap-
plying this doctrine make determinations about the degree of risk that
was present at the time of purchase, as well as what degree of risk the
court will deem sufficient to defeat the owner's expectations, and this
involves making what are unavoidably subjective judgments. In
Good, for instance, one could view the fact that the wetlands regula-
tory program was in existence at the time of the purchase, combined
with the existence of the disclaimer clause in the purchase agreement,
as evidence that there was a divergence of opinion about the risk in-
volved in trying to develop the property, and thus, under Mandelker's
theory, there was a high degree of risk. That Good was able to obtain
repeated approvals, on the other hand, could lead one to believe that
perhaps the risk was not as high as the seller thought, and that it
would be legitimate to conclude that the regulatory risk was not suffi-
cient to defeat Good's investment-backed expectations.
Even if one believes that the regulatory risk was high at the time
of Good's purchase, though, there is still the question of whether the
risk generated by the wetlands regulation should be sufficient to de-
feat Good's claim that his property was taken by operation of the
ESA. Professor Mandelker explains that investment-backed expecta-
tions are to be evaluated as of the time of purchase, and that an owner
who purchases property with knowledge of a regulatory scheme under
which the government could deny permission to develop the property
should assume "the regulatory risk this program creates. This
could be interpreted to mean that the regulatory risk created by a par-
ticular program is specific only to that program and would defeat a
taking claim based on that regulation, but it would not defeat a taking
claim when the challenged regulation was not in existence at the time
of the purchase. However, it could also be interpreted to mean that
although the regulatory risk is evaluated as of the time of purchase,
once a high degree of risk is established, it is sufficient to defeat any
subsequent takings claim, regardless of whether the challenged regu-
lation actually created any risk at the time of purchase.
Professor Mandelker's theory clearly contemplates that courts
should deny protection of an owner's expectations in some circum-
'4 Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Creppel v.
United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
145 Mandelker, supra note 101, at 139.
146 Id. at 129.
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stances when a regulation is passed after the purchase of the prop-
erty. 147 As an illustration, he discusses the case of McNulty v. Town
of Indialantic,148 in which a property owner was denied compensa-
tion. The challenged regulation, a beach-setback ordinance that pro-
hibited the owner from building a home on his beachfront lot, was not
passed until after the lot was purchased, but at the time of purchase
building on McNulty's lot required permission of the town. Addi-
tionally, the purchase price of the lot was only five percent of the
price of other comparable lots in the area. 150 Professor Mandelker
explains that the decision of the court in McNulty to deny compensa-
tion is consistent with the regulatory risk theory because although the
beach-setback ordinance had not been adopted at the time of pur-
chase, there was a foreseeable risk that such an ordinance would be
passed in the future, and there would have been widely divergent
opinions about whether such an ordinance would be enacted.' 5'
On its face, this logic could be applied in a situation like Good to
conclude that the owner should be denied compensation. The facts of
McNulty, however, can be distinguished from those in Good. The
beach-setback ordinance involved the same substantive concerns for
protection of the beach area that existed at the time of purchase and
that created the regulatory risk identified by Mandelker. The rock-
bottom purchase price was evidence of this. This would be analogous
to Good if Good had been denied development permits based on the
wetlands regulations that became more strict after his purchase, but
that is not what happened in Good. For the facts in McNulty to be
more analogous to Good, the owner would have to have been granted
a variance to build under the beach-setback ordinance, repeatedly, and
then denied permission to develop based on an unrelated concern that
was not in existence at the time of purchase.
Given a factual situation like Good, the regulatory risk theory,
like the current case law, is wanting because it is ambiguous. One
solution would be to modify Professor Mandelker's theory somewhat
and use a specific rather than a general theory of regulatory risk. Un-
der this theory, regulatory risk would be evaluated at the time of pur-
chase and based on the purchaser's actual or constructive knowledge
at that time. The regulatory risk incurred by the purchaser, however,
would be specific to the regulations creating the risk at the time of
purchase and could not be used to defeat an owner's investment-
backed expectations in a takings case involving different regulations.
147 See Professor Mandelker's discussion of the constructive notice rule, id. at 136-38.
148 727 F. Supp. 604 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
141 See id. at 604.
'50 See id. at 611 ("McNulty purchased the property in 1963 for $25 a front foot when lots
of suitable depth for residential building were selling for $500 a front foot.") (citation omitted).
151 Mandelker, supra note 101, at 137-38.
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Applied to Good, this would mean that if Good had been denied his
permits based on wetlands regulations, the regulatory risk created by
the wetlands regulations in place at the time of his purchase would
defeat his investment-backed expectations. Because Good was de-
nied permits pursuant to the ESA, however, a court would evaluate
the degree of risk present at the time of Good's purchase that the ESA
would prevent him from developing his property. Wetlands regula-
tions would be irrelevant to this inquiry, and the regulatory risk cre-
ated by them would not be sufficient to defeat Good's investment-
backed expectations.
Predicting the effect of the ESA on his property would have re-
quired Good to make at least a four-step prediction. First, he would
have to predict the passage of the law itself. Second, he would have
to predict that it would protect species like rats and not just bald ea-
gles, grizzly bears, and the like. Third, he would have to predict that
"protection" under the ESA would mean nbt just protection from
hunters but in some cases prohibiting private property owners from
building on their own land. And fourth, he would also have to predict
that endangered species would be found in his backyard. Bearing in
mind that the ESA was not passed until after Good purchased the
property, and that the species on his land were not listed as endan-
gered until 1990 and 1991,152 it seems legitimate to conclude that un-
der a specific regulatory risk theory the government would find it dif-
ficult to establish that Good had assumed the regulatory risk associ-
ated with the ESA, and that he therefore lacked reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations.
Just as Professor Mandelker's theory is based not on a "single
unitary theory" but rather on "pragmatic judgments" about what the
law in this area should be, so, too, is this suggestion that the courts
adopt a specific rather than a general regulatory risk theory. There
are, however, several arguments in favor of adopting such a theory.
First, one can find some support in the case law. The cases refer
to the requirement in regulatory takings cases that an owner prove
that he purchased his property "in reliance on the non-existence of the
challenged regulation, '  or, put another way, that an owner who
purchases propertr "with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of
economic loss. ''15 This language could clearly be interpreted to sup-
port a specific regulatory risk theory, and the talk of "knowledge," or
assumption of risk, dovetails with another consideration in favor of
this theory, that of the public's perception of fairness and justice in
regulatory takings.
152 See supra note 4 regarding passage of the ESA. See supra note 44 regarding endan-
gered status for the Lower Keys rabbit and the silver rice rat.




Public perceptions of regulatory takings law should be consid-
ered by decision-makers when setting policy in this area.1 51 What
Professor Michelman has called "demoralization costs" arise when
property owners, and those who sympathize with them, are disturbed
by what they perceive to be the injustice of uncompensated takings,
resulting in lost future production.156 Concluding that an owner as-
sumes at purchase the regulatory risk of a regulation not passed until
after his purchase, and that he is therefore not entitled to compensa-
tion, is a transaction with a high demoralization cost, unless there are
very strong arguments to be made that the purchaser somehow had
notice of the regulation before purchase even though it was not passed
until later.
The key to the public's perception of fairness in the takings pro-
cess intuitively seems to be that the owner should have at least some
degree of knowledge of the existence of the regulatory scheme before
holding that he assumed the risk created by the regulation. This is
what makes the holding in Good seem unfair. It does not seem rea-
sonable to conclude that Good assumed the regulatory risk associated
with the ESA at the time of his purchase, and it feels like judicial
sleight-of-hand to hold that his claim is nevertheless defeated because
he "assumed the risk" of a regulatory scheme that he was able repeat-
edly to satisfy. A theory of regulatory risk that is specific to the
challenged regulation comports more with general ideas of fairness
and justice.
Also, it seems logical to look to the assumption of risk doctrine
in tort law for guidance in this area, and there one finds that the doc-
trine requires specific knowledge of the risk on the part of the party
held to have assumed the risk."15 If tort law controlled in the analysis
of the Good case, Good would not have been found to have assumed
risk that would negate his ESA-based regulatory taking claim. Thus,
there is support for a theory of specific regulatory risk in an area of
the law that has dealt extensively and thoughtfully with the concept of
assumption of risk.
Because a specific theory comports more with traditional ideas
of fairness, it is also more intuitive and easily understood by the lay-
person. This provides more certainty for property owners, and re-
duces what can be called "search costs,"1  which arise when pro-
1'5 See William W. Fisher l1, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doc-
trine, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1774 (1988).
'm See Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
157 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965) ("Except where he expressly so
agrees, a plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arising from the defendant's conduct unless he
then knows of the existence of the risk and appreciates its unreasonable character.").
158 See Fisher, supra note 155, at 1780. In defining search costs, Professor Fisher writes:
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spective owners, doubtful about the fairness of the takings compensa-
tion system, refuse to act before taking extra time to "look up the
rules," and perhaps to research every conceivable risk with regard to
the property. Under a regime that follows the Good decision, even
after exhaustive research a prospective property owner cannot be
certain what future risks they have assumed unless the property is
completely devoid of all regulatory risk. One would expect that this
decision would impede the marketability of properties with low to
moderate, but nevertheless significant, regulatory risk. Owners
should fear that even if they correctly assess that they can obtain
regulatory approval for their plans in a low risk environment, they
may be held in the future to have assumed the much larger risk of an
as-yet unknown regulation, with ensuing losses that could be quite
large. A specific risk theory reduces this problem by enabling pro-
spective owners to base their risk assessment on factors known at that
time.
Another reason for making regulatory risk specific to the chal-
lenged regulation is that it solves, in some cases, the problem of prop-
erty value disappearing as a result of extensive regulation, that would
otherwise amount to a compensable taking, without compensation
being paid to anyone by the government. The situation in Good is
actually a good example of this problem. Assuming for purposes of
discussion that Good would have been able to satisfy all other ele-
ments of a regulatory taking claim, the court's holding means that,
nevertheless, he may not recover because he assumed the risk of the
regulation at the time of purchase, and it is assumed that the market
discounted the price of the property to account for this risk. Again
assuming all other necessary elements of a takings claim, one might
expect that this means that the previous owner would have had a valid
claim, because the regulation caused a reduction in the value of his
property.
But this is not so in a case like Good's. The previous owner did
not have a takings claim because he was not denied permission to de-
velop his property,159 and Good has shown that, had the prior owner
[A] judicial decision denying compensation in defiance of a popular perception that
it should be forthcoming risks undermining people's faith that, by and large, the law
comports with their sense of justice. Erosion of that faith, in turn, would reduce
people's willingness to make decisions-the rationality of which depends upon the
content of the pertinent legal rules-without taking the time to 'look up' the rules.
Id. He goes on to explain that many big decisions, such as buying a car or renting an apartment,
are routinely made without thoroughly researching the applicable legal rules, on the assumption
that those rules generally comport with the decision-maker's sense of justice. This is an effi-
cient state of affairs, and decisions that undermine the willingness of society members to act in
this fashion would give rise to costs. See id.
159 See Gregory M. Stein, Who Gets the Taking Claim? Changes in Land Use Law, Pre-
Enactment Owners, and Post-Enactment Buyers, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (2000) (proposing that
courts recognize the previous owner's claim as ripe if he has sold "his property at a reduced
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applied to the Corps for permission to develop, it would have been
granted, just as permission was granted to Good. Where, then, did the
taking go? In a case like Good's, somewhere during the transfer of
property a significant portion of its value disappears, leaving both
seller and buyer unable to pursue an otherwise valid regulatory taking
action and providing a windfall at their expense to the government.
A theory of regulatory risk that is specific to the challenged
regulation would address this problem in some cases, as it would in
Good, but the "government windfall" problem would appear to be a
problem with any regulatory risk approach that denies relief in some
circumstances when the challenged regulation was passed after the
owner purchased the property. In those cases, neither seller nor buyer
can recover for what would otherwise be a valid taking, and although
a specific theory of regulatory risk would eliminate this scenario in
cases like Good, it would not eliminate the problem in cases like
McNulty.
Another problem that would remain despite a specific regulatory
risk approach is that of the circularity inherent in the whole doctrine
of investment-backed expectations. This problem was discussed by
Justice Kennedy in the Supreme Court's Lucas decision, 160 and has to
do with the phenomenon that, given the nature of investment-backed
expectations jurisprudence, to a certain degree "property tends to be-
come what courts say it is."' 161 The more intrusive on property rights
the courts allow government to become without paying compensation,
the less reasonable property owners' expectations become, and the
less likely they are to succeed on their claims. Good is an excellent
illustration of this principle in action, because the court held that that
the owner's investment-backed expectations were negated in part by
the "regulatory climate" that existed at the time of his purchase.
price rather than... applying unsuccessfully for permission to build"). Note that the factual
situation discussed by Professor Stein is not an exact analogy to the facts in Good, because he
presupposes that the seller would have been denied permission to develop but chose to sell at a
reduced price instead. In Good, it appears that had the prior owner applied for permission to
develop at the time of the sale, the permit would have been granted. Professor Stein's proposal
would therefore not help in a situation like that in Good unless the court were to recognize a
taking caused by a reduction in property value due not to an actual regulation in place at the
time, but by regulatory risk that such a regulation might be passed in the future.
160 See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course; for if
the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of
governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it is.").
161 Id.
162 See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("In view of the
regulatory climate that existed when Appellant acquired the subject property, Appellant could
not have had a reasonable expectation that he would obtain approval to fill ten acres of wetlands
in order to develop the land."); see also Eagle, supra note 100 ('Through the marvel of circular-
ity, Good stands for the proposition that the more the state intrudes upon property rights, the
stronger the 'regulatory climate' becomes, and the fewer property rights remain.").
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This is undeniably a problem, but one which the Court has recognized




On balance, the Good decision is a worrisome precedent. The
court's emphasis on the regulatory climate that existed at the time
Good purchased the property is deeply troubling, 164 as is the court's
holding that the risk assumed by Good with respect to the wetlands
regulations defeats his investment-backed expectations with regard to
the ESA. For the reasons enumerated above, our takings jurispru-
dence would be better served by a specific regulatory risk doctrine in
which a plaintiffs assumed risk is evaluated only with respect to the
challenged regulation.
Some may argue that making it more difficult for property own-
ers to recover from the government is a "win" for environmental
causes. 165 This may be true in the short term, but the long-term ef-
fects of such "wins" still remains to be seen. As cases mount in
which a significant portion of the public perceives an unjust result,
the chances of a public backlash against environmental regulations
increase. 166 The problem has to do with why cases like Good would
be considered a win for environmental causes-that the precedent
163 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Some circularity must be
tolerated in these matters, however, as it is in other spheres. The definition, moreover, is not
circular in its entirety. The expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective
rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.") (citation omit-
ted).
164 See Eagle, supra note 100 ("Good is an important case because its 'regulatory climate'
language is the culmination of a subtle and gradual shift in how some judges view property
rights.").
165 See, e.g., Florida's New Friends are 'A Rat and a Rabbit,' PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 9,
2000, at 2E ("After years of setbacks in the Legislature, the effort to preserve Florida's natural
environment from mangrove destroyers and land speculators won a crucial victory last week
from another branch of government [the Supreme Court].").
166 In a chapter on the Endangered Species Act with the subtitle, How to create a monster
that causes peasants carrying torches and pitchforks to storm your castle, Professor DeLong
writes:
The Endangered Species Act... is one of two federal programs particularly respon-
sible for stoking outrage over violations of people's right to property. The other is
federal control of wetlands. Without these, many problems would arise under many
state and federal laws, but wetlands and ESA are heating the boiler to the bursting
point .... Each program responds to a problem serious enough to justify concern
and action. In each case, the response is to conscript private property to national en-
vironmental causes with no compensation.
JAMES V. DELONG, PROPERTY MATTERS 91 (1997). See also More Bad Law, LAS VEGAS REV.
J., Apr. 10, 2000, at 6B ("Last Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered another blow to
property owners, as it let stand a Florida ruling that could make it far more difficult for land-




established reduces the overall cost of environmental regulation. 167
But that cost reduction comes at the expense of private property own-
ers. If our society as a whole cannot allocate sufficient resources to
protect the environment adequately, it is unclear why individual prop-
erty owners should be expected to bear that public burden alone.
It is possible to believe both that the environment should be
protected, and that the public should pay for this protection. 168 The
silver rice rat and the Lower Keys rabbit are protected for the good of
all of society, not for the private benefit of Good, and it seems only
fair therefore that the burden of that protection be borne by all. In the
immortal words of Justice Holmes: "We are in danger of forgetting
that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the con-
stitutional way of paying for the change."
STEVEN D. MCGREW
167 See Property Rights Advocates Dealt Major Blow by Court, NAT. WILDLIFE, Feb. 1,
2000, available in LEXIS, News Group File ("'This decision is a major setback for special
interests that want to use legislation and litigation to make environmental regulations too expen-
sive to enforce,' says Glenn Sugamelli, an NwF attorney.").
168 See Eagle, supra note 100 ("[W]hether Congress should enact new environmental laws
or the Corps of Engineers should adopt stringent enforcement mechanisms are issues separate
from whom should bear the cost."). At least one California county has taken the position that
they will purchase land needed for conservation purposes. Riverside County Supervisor Tom
Mullen explained that "[tihe county is trying to identify the property it needs for its habitat-
conservation plans and buy it, he said. If a purchase is not possible within five years, the county
will help property owners develop. 'The Fifth Amendment means something,' he said." Onell
R. Soto, Land Ruling Concerns Inland Observers, PREss-ENTERPRISE, Sept. 21, 1999, at B2.
169 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922).
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